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"Leader: What is your lineage, stranger?
Tell us-who was your father?
Oedipus: God help met
Dear girl, what must I suffer now?
Antigone: Say it. You're driven right to the edge."t
Sophocles' Antigone has elicited many superlatives. Hölderlin
considered the play to be the most difficult, the most enigmatic
and the most essentially Greek of plays. This paper treats a matter
of enigma in the play, one that is crucial to understanding the central
stakes of the drama. Its main purpose is to propose a novel account
of this enigma and briefly to contrast this account with two other
readings of the play.
One passage in particular has prompted the view that the
play is extremely enigmatic; it is a passage that has been read with
astonishment by many commentators and taken to demand
explanation. This is Antigone's defense speech at lines 905-914.
Here, she famously provides what appear to her to be reasons for
her burying her brother Polynices against the explicit command of
her king and uncle, Creon. Her claim is that she would not have
deliberately violated Creon's command, would not have intentionally
broken his law or edict, had this edict barred her from burying a
child or a husband of hers. She states that if her husband or child
had died "there might have been another." But since both her
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mother and father are dead, she reasons, "no brother could ever
spring to light again."2 Reasoning of this sort has a precedent in a
tale found in Herodotus' Histones, and Aristotle cites it in Rhetoric
as an example of giving an explanation for something that one's
auditors may at first find incredible.3 To Aristotle, then, Antigone's
defense speech appears to have been "rhetorically satisfactory," as
Bernard Knox says.4 However, such a reception is rare among
commentators.5
Dramatic Implausibility
Indeed, commentators including Goethe and Lacan have
considered this supposed reasoning a scandal and something closer
to non-reasoning, something nearly inhuman. Goethe hoped that
one day the passage would be shown to be interpolated.6 Therese
Ahern Augst7 writes that Antigone's valuing this particular brother
uniquely means that she "approaches the limit of what is
commonly understood to be human nature." Others, like Bernard
Knox, find Antigone's thinking both distressing and contradictory.
Knox argues that in this speech Antigone abandons the
justification she had put forth throughout the play, namely, that
of the priority of blood-relations, especially over state commands
or the laws oE mortals or men.8 He alleges that:
her assertion that she would not have done for her
children what she has done for Polynices is a
spectacular betrayal of that fanaticalloyalty to
blood relationship which she urged on Ismene and
defended against Creon, for there is no closer
relationship imaginable than that between the
mother and the children of her own body.9
It is, he argues, a "strange piece of reasoning" that Antigone
marshals to justify the "disturbing statement" that she would not
have committed her lawbreaking deed for a husband or child of
hers. Knox realizes that the defense involves the irreplaceability
of Polynices. But his reading does not see that questions which
are the motor of the dramatic course and tragic problems of the
play itself, and the answers to which he takes for granted, are
precisely what are either unanswered or in play in the dramatic
action of the work.
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Attempted Solutions: "But You're in Love with
Impossibility"l0
Knox interprets Antigone's true motive as betraying a general
principle of devotion to blood relations. He holds that though she
begins by defending herself in universal terms, with such claims as
"Hades longs for the same rites for all:'ll she ultimately demonstrates
that this is not the genuine motive for her prioritizing of her brother
over a hypothetical husband or child in the defense speech. He finds
that in the end:
the driving force behind her action, the private, irrational
imperative which was at the root of her championship of
the rights of family and the dead against the demands of
the state...is her fanatical devotion to one particular family,
her own, the doomed, incestuous, accursed house of
Oedipus and especially to its most unfortunate member,
the brother whose corpse lay exposed to the birds and
dogs.12
How does this relate to her championing of the divine la~ for
Knox? He argues that this "purely personal" motive of devotion to
her own family is the "determinant" for her allegiance to the divine
la~He identifies Antigone as an instance of a Sophoclean hero whose
determined aetions and unyielding character are those of "humanbeings
who refuse to recognize the limits irnposed on the individual will by
men and gods, and go to death or triumph, magnificently defiant to
the last."13
Others have regarded the passage as tuming on a question of
love, as either a rejection of the erotic, as in Martha Nussbaum's
assessment, or as the incoherence of extreme passion, as in Elizabeth
Wyckoff's account. Nussbaum writes: .
The best explanation for this coldly determined priority-
ordering of duties is that Antigone is not animated by
personal love at all, but by a stern determination to have a
fixed set of ordered requirements that will dictate her
actions without engendering conflict; her refusal of the
erotic.. .is then sufficient to explain her choice of the
brother....14
And Wyckoff offers the view that Antigone is "clinging to her
irrational profundity of feeling for her lost and irreplaceable brother,
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devising legalistic arguments for her intellectual justification."15
These, then, are a few of the many reasons for which readers of
the play have found this passage confounding, and several of the ways
that they have sought to account for its oddity: Before a sketch of this
paper's proposed understanding of the enigma of the passage, abrief
presentation of two inventive and important interpretations of the
play follows: those of Jacques Lacan andJudith Butler. Each of these
thinkers mines Sophocles' drama with relentless care for its
philosophical yield. In order to clarify the details of this paper's reading,
their interpretations will be contrasted to it. The comparison focuses
on the readings of the enigmatic passage at issue and points related
specifically to it.
Jacques Lacan: The Tautology of Human Being
In "L'Essence de la tragedie: un commentaire de l'Antigone de
Sophocle,"16Jacques Lacan discusses Goethe's perplexity atAntigone's
scandalous ranking of her brother over an eventual husband or child.
Though Goethe's shock at the passage includes the wish that it one
day be shown not to have been part of the original text, Lacan judges
this hope unlikely; if it bad been known to be so scandalous why would
Aristotle have cited the passage despite that fact a mere eighty or so
years after its composition? One of Lacan's many aims in the essay is
to make sense of this apparently implausible passage.
According to Lacan, Antigone's elevation of her brother, her
willingness-and will-to die for revering him, stems from her
insistence on bis very being, stripped of any of the contingencies of
bis individual histo!)T. This being, unadomed by a past of action, by
inherited particularities--not caught in a knotted line of descent, or
murderously counterpoised to a brother-is conceivable only thanks
to the advent of language, for Lacan. For her part, Antigone cites "the
great unwritten, unshakeable traditions....these laws;"17 if she disobeys
Creon's royal command, it is to obey another la~ and only to obey it.18
Lacan argues that legality itself is of the structure of language, and
thatevenif Antigone's cherishedlaws are "unwritten," their nomological
quality itself is conceivable onlyon the basis of the essence of language.
The unique value of the brother's bare being, shom of its lifetime of
qualifiers, is a function of the individuating and reifying powers of
signification. It is signification alone that permits the ontologieal
isolation of the being ofa being, absttacting it both from a Heraclitean
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flow of change and from its own causa! history. Language freezes the
frame on what passes~) as undifferentiated. In doing so, it reveals that
which perdures in its tautological quiddity: it is what it iS.19 Lacan explains:
My brother is what he is, and it is because he is what he is,
and because only he could be that, that I proceed towards
this fatal limit. If it were any one else whosoever with
whom I could have a human relation, my husband, my
ch1ldren, they are replaceable, they are relations, but this
brother who is aea1t'to~, who has this thing in common
with me of beingbomof the samewomb--the etymology
of aöeAq>o~aIludes to the womb--and of being ried to
the same father, the criminal father whose criminal
aftereffects Antigone is trying to cleanse-this brother is
something unique, and it is this alone that moves me to
oppose your edicts. (278-279)20
The brother's value is held to be that of a unique being, the
being named by a proper name. In fact, contrasting the human being
with a dog, Lacan proposes that the text implies that the burial
requirement itself flows from the nature of the being endowed with a
proper name: "One cannot do away with bis remains while forgetting
that the register of the being of he who has been able to be situated by
means of a name must be preserved by the act of the funeral." But at
the same time, Lacan holds that Polynices is uniquely valuable because
he shares a feature with Antigone, namely, being born of the same
womb.
Though Lacan's account does not represent an entirely coherent
interpretation, it is consistent in suggesting that uniqueness, and unique
value, flow from signification. The proper name permits the ontological
excision from the indistinction of constant change and the
determination of any individual identity over time. But it would seem
that Lacan's demonstration extends too broadly for it to be of specific
use in bis present argument. If true, itwould be true of all of those other
beings---husband, child, anyone (not bomof the same womb?}--that the
explanation is supposed to exclude from its scope.
The crux of Lacan's position with respect to the enigmatic passage
is that there is a signifying void at the heart of Antigone's justification.
This void is the radical break. and the atemporality that paradoxically is
inaugurated--that is, it occurs at a time-with the advent of the
linguistic function of detaching pure being from...everything else.
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Laean writes that: "this purity, this separation of the being from all the
eharaeteristies of the historieal drama it has gone through, this exaetly
is the limit, the ex nihilo about whieh Antigone takes plaee" (279).21
But perhaps Laean is too hasty here. How does the brother's
uniqueness stem both from "being born of the same womb" and
from being radically detaehed from bis "historie drama?" Is not "being
born of the same womb" part of his ''historie drama?" How "detached"
from his history can he be if his very birth itself is eonsequential, that
is, if his birth entails his uniqueness, or his uniqueness 10 Antigone? Is
his birth prior to his history, displaeed backwards into an untimed,
unthought, imagined zone so that he ean exist purely, an ahistorieally
unique being?
One way of squaring Lacan's claims is to eonsider that Polyniees
is unique beeause he is born of the same womb, as would be anyone
who is also born of the same womb. This comes eloser to expressing
the heart of Antigone's thinking, in my vi~ but what remains to be
investigated here is whyAntigone might be partieularly coneerned with
this. I hope to provide an answer to this question belo~
In the meantime, it would be helpful to note that when Laean
enumerates those for whom Antigone would allegedly not violate the
royal prohibition, he writes "any one else whosoever with whom I
eould have a human relation, my husband, my ehildren, they are
replaeeable, they are relations ...." Yet this is a misleading
eharaeterization of Antigone's thought. In faet, she does not say that
she would not break Creon's law for anyone else exeept her brother, or
for anyone else exeept a brother, or, for that matter, for anyone else
exeept someone "born of the same womb." She just says she would
not break the royal ediet for a dead husband or child. This is not the
same as claiming she would do it for no one else besides her brother,
or a brother or a sibling. Ineidentally, she also does not say that she
would not bury anyone else. She says she would not break the law to
bury a husband or ehild.
Certainly, Antigone grants her invading brother a special status,
even one that is special because he is born "of the same womb." The
question raised by the enigmatie passage, though, is a eomparative one:
why rank the brother overhusband and child (and not, as Laean implies,
over anyone besides Polynices)? Why not consider allphilous, that is, all
"'friends and 'elose relations,"'22 as equally worthy of risking death by
violation of a royal deeree prohibiting their burial? After all, why would
husband or ehild not likewise each be what each is, and each likewise
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be considerable and unique in bis or her very being itself? If Lacan
means that it is in his role as brother that Polynices is what he is, then
husband or child could likewise each be what each is in bis or her role
as husband or child.
Moreover, it is not simply that the brother is irreplaceable and an
eventual husband or child is replaceable. As I hope to show belo~
there are two issues of replaceability: one is the issue of replaceability
per se, the other is the issue of replaceability I(y Antigone, that is, by her
own effort or agency. Commentators have overlooked this second issue
though its importance for the passage in question is great.
If the first sort of replaceability were solely what was at issue,
this would imply that Polynices would obtain his unique comparative
value solely upon the death or infertility of his parents. For prior to
either of those, he would be replaceable precisely in the sense that bis
parents could generate another son (assuming they could). That is, he
would be replaceable in the very sense that Antigone proclaims her
own future child to be; she could have another (child). Gf course, it is
odd to think that Antigone is dying to consecrate the special value of
her brother as it emerged suddenly upon the death of her parents! We
have reason to suspect that something else is operating to account for
her reasoning.
Judith Butler: Normative Repetition and Radical
Singularity
There is not the space here to address in detail the far-ranging
philosophical analysis offered in Antigone~ Claim,23 Judith Butler's
probing inquiry into Sophocles' Antigone. The ultra-welcome critiques
of Hegel and Lacan, the urgently clear questioning of a whole bistory
of anthropological, feminist, and psychoanalytic thought on kinship,
and the vitally topical formulations of conceptual problems confronting
research on the philosophical issues that artend ne~ or apparently
ne~ family forms and modes of kinship all light the way in particularly
forbidding territory. They are equally courageous, politically stimulating,
and insightful.
Butler is especially helpful in pointing out Antigone's profound
kinship confusion, and the difficulty of locatingAntigone in the drama
either as a representative of any specific position on kinship or as a
representative of any specific position within a kinship system. In
addition, the book displays "the socially contingent character of
24
ANTIGONE'S LINE
kinship"24 despite the fact that this contingencyis repeatedly congealed
into a static necessity in much critical assessment and theoretical use
of the play. Perhaps most importantly, for my present purposes, Butler's
analysis presents the socially contingent nature of kinship in the play
as a function of actions, and specifically of Antigone's claims about-
and claimings oE-her deeds. Her claims about her deeds are themselves
likewise deeds that serve to create kinship as a repeated norm. For
Butler, though, since the life of a norm requires for its sustenance a
repetition whose substance can never be guaranteed to be perfectly
replicated, the possibility for the "aberrant repetition of a norm"25 is
itself a necessary feature of normativit)r. If the replication of a norm
were guaranteed, were an inevitabili~ then of course there would be
no obeying or disobeying it, no satisfying or failing to satisfy it. Were it
impossible to disobey, it would be no norm. The norm has a funetion---
or is what it is-only when it may fall to be met
My view accords on many points with this performative account
of kinship. However, it diverges distinctly from Butler's thought on
the matter of when and where the aberrations in kinship occur in this
tale. Without wishing to make of Antigone a regressive figure yearning
to reinstate a stultifying family form, the account I wish to propose
locates the aberration fairly traditionally in Oedipus andJocasta's offense
and considers Antigone's struggle to be an essentially restorative or
reparative effort. For Butler, Antigone's "incestuous love of her
brother"26 is a "deformation of kinship that she performs."27 But
certainly the play asserts that adeformation has aIready occurred in
her parents' generation of her, and of Polynices, Eteocles and Ismene.
This does not mean that she could not enact her own deformation of
kinship, of course. However, though it is intense and unyielding,
Antigone's love for her btother does not seem to be uniquely or
extremely incestuous relative to other loves or professions of love in
the play: For Ismene and Haemon also express intense love that could
be considered incestuous. Ismene professes her love for Antigone in
tones that resemble Antigone's passionate pleas for her brother's priorit)r.
Of Polynices, Antigone insists: ''1 willlie with the one I love and loved
by him."28 But Ismene exclaims to Antigone: "What do I care for life,
cut off from you?"29 Pleading to die with Antigone, Ismene begs: "Oh
no, my sister, don't reject me, please, / let me die besideyou, consecrating
/ the dead together."30 And finally, to Creon, she agonizes: "How can
I live alone, without her?"31
For his part, Creon expects, or compels, his son Haemon to
25
MARY BETH MADER
declare bis unconditionallove for him. Creon presses Haemon: '~e
you coming no~ raving against your father? / Or do you love me, no
matter what I do?" Haemon replies: "Father, I'm your son.. .you in
your wisdom /set my bearing for me-I obey you. / No marriage
could ever mean more to me than you...."32 Here, Haemon is pushed
to profess his father's priority over any eventual wife-Iet alone over
Antigone, his future bride-inbis affections. Creon evidences no shame,
in fact, in requiring of Haemon exactly what he just deplored in
Antigone's defense of her actions: unconditionallove. A mere eight
pages prior to Creon's demand on Haemon, he is outraged byAntigone's
neglect of the condition that Creon believes renders Polynices
unmournable, namely, that he made himself an enemy of the city of
Thebes.
Perhaps these two instances simply mean that these other
characters express or desire intense loves that could be considered
incestuous because, after all, they are all afflicted by the incestuous
family history and are fatally repeating it. Even if this is so, however,
these instances show that Antigone's intense devotion to Polynices is
simply not unique in the play. Indeed, that the brother-sister love is
readily classed as incestuous by commentators, while the love bet\Veen
sisters or the love between father and son is not, may simply express a
preponderant anxiety about specifically heterosexual incest or perhaps
reproductive incest. Of course, in some cases, this preponderance may
actually be an inability to suspect incestuous potential in such
relationsbips for the reason that same-sex relations have not registered
as potentially amorous or erotic at alle But it is not at all clear to me that
any of these relations should be considered incestuous by the standards
of the play. What is clear is that the reproductive mother-son incest of
Jocasta and Oedipus is indeed considered a calamity and an offense.
Butler also argues that Antigone undermines her own
pronouncements at several crucial junctures. She adopts Creon's
language of sovereignty, deploying it to argue that she must violate the
royallaw in the interest of serving another la~ the unwritten laws of
the gods. And yet, Butler argues, this lawis no ttue la~ for its hyberbolic
particularity means that it applies in only a single instance, to the case
of the dead Polynices. Butler construes Antigone's defense speech to
mean that "she would risk defying the official edict for no kin but
Polyneices."33 Further, Antigone seeks to express the "radical singularity
of her brother"34 but falls to achieve this singular reference due to the
necessary multiplicity of language itself: Her use of the term 'brother'
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will always be polyreferential and thus can never isolate her one love in
a way that does justice to bis uniqueness.
And this despite the fact, for Butler, that brother and father are
hardly distinguishable by Antigone. ''They are," Butler writes, "after
all, already interchangeable for her, and yet her act reinstitutes and
reelaborates that interchangeability."35 Here, my view is nearly the
contrary! It seems correct to say both that Antigone grapples with the
question ofwho exactly are her brothers and that she attempts to refer
only to her brother Polynices in defenses of herseiE But it seems to
me that her efforts are motivated by the aim to disambiguate the multiple
statuses of both Polynices and Oedipus and that this aim precedes the
staged events of the pla)T. Further, it does not seem to me thatAntigone
has claimed that she would perform the violative deed for no other
kin. Perhaps, finally, an exposition of my understanding of the specific
sense of the enigmatic defense speech will help to clarify my partially
contrary reading.
Another Answer: "[doom.] It extends to all the kin."36
Although commentators are correct to stress the irreplaceability
of Antigone's brother Polynices, it is an error to consider her reasoning
to concern Polynices as abrother, that is, as a'!Y brother of a'!Y sister. In
other words, many readers, Iike Hege~ extend the argument to apply to
all brothers and sisters. This is an error for at least one crucial reason,
and it is an error that almost all commentators on the play commit.
Within the dramatic logic of the play, Antigone's family form itself is
both singular and monstrous. In other words, most commentators
have not taken seriously the very dramatic core that gives the play its
tragic element: the horror that is the family and the very figures in the
play, and especially the fact that the play treats this family as distinctly
aberrational. To think that in her defense speech Antigone could be
providing a universalizable or generally recommendable rationale for
her action, then, is to ignore the exceptional nature of her family form,
and for any kinship relations within it. (Perhaps Sophocles'
contemporaries did not make this error, and thus perhaps did not
experience the same baffled incredulity at her attempted explanation
as have subsequent commentators.) When Antigone argues for the
irreplaceability of Polynices, then, she should not automatically be taken
to be arguing for the irreplaceability to a sister (or even to a sibling) of
a brother (or even a sibling). This should not be done because her
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family form is singularly aberrant according to the play itself: the
incestuous nature of her family is the source of her suffering, as the
play makes clear repeatedly.
Accordingly, some readers tend to miss the profundity and
meaning of Antigone's "family affection" for her brother. They also
tend to ignore the importance of what she mightwish notto do. Further,
the question of Antigone as agent, what she can do or effeet and what
she cannot or will not do or effect is one of the play's great issues. This
issue takes urgent shape in the following questions: (1) In particular,
what exactly is a brother? (2) More generally, how are family or kin
relations created and maintained? Antigone is about the establishment,
erosion, or re-establishment of a certain type of kin relation and a
family constellation that preserves it.
Antigone is not simply honoring her brother because he is her
brother, she is making a man be her brother by her treatment of him.
Most importantly, she is establishing (or attempting to establish) her
brother as onfy her brother by symbolically refusing a family precedent,
namely that of generating one's own sibling. Antigone's devotion to her
brother must be understood against the backdrop of her family story.
Jocasta is both her mother and her granclmother. That is,Jocasta is the
parent of her own child Oedipus and of her own grandchildren; she is
both the parent and the granclmother of her own children by Oedipus.
Oedipus is both Antigone's father and her brother; she is both his
sister and his daughter. Further, taking into account Antigone's relation
to Polynices by way of her relations with other family members,
Polynices could also be said to be Antigone's uncle or her nephe~By
way of Oedipus as Antigone's brother, Polynices is the son of
Antigone's brother, which makes him her nephew: But by way of
Oedipus as Antigone's father, Polynices is Antigone's unde, since
Polynices is her father's brother. So, she is sister, aunt and niece to
Polynices.
In order to understand Antigone's ttagic efforts, consider two
categories of kin relations:37
(1) Relations thatone cannotgenerate oneself: Of these, one cannot
"get another" because one cannot get one tout court. According to the
vocabulary of the normative form of kinship order from which the
Oedipal family has departed, this category includes: father and mother.38
(2) Relations that one can generate oneself or help to generate
oneself Of these, one can "get another" in the sense that one plays a
causal role in their coming to be. According to that same vocabulary
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of the normative form of kinship order from which the Oedipal family
has departed, this category includes: child, husband, and wife.
We can understand the question hauntingAntigone as: Is 'brother'
of the first or the second sort of relation? Is 'brother' in category (1)
or (2)? When it is producrive of a child, Oedipal incest amounts to
putting the sibling relation or the brother relation in category (2). That
is, Antigone cou/d "get another" brother, were she to follow in her
father's footsteps and generate a brother by him, her parent39 Against
the background of Oedipal incest placing the sibling relation in category
(2), we can read Antigone's violative deed as a passionate attempt to
restore the sibling relation to category (1). Her burial of her brother is
the makingof a brother as something that "cannot" be made by oneself;
it is an attempt to make a "can not" of an "ought not," to impart to a
supposed socia! or moral necessity the strength of an ontological
necessity. The point of the play is that we may not assume that this is
given, but that brothers are made as brothers-who-are-not-also-uncles
by a refusal of the Oedipal type of incest. In a sense then, if this
refusal is a making, Antigone's insistence on performing the burial
rites for her brother as brother consecrates not just a dead beloved
sibling but a certain precarious version of siblinghood or brotherhood
itself, and attempts to bring a lost generational order back to the family.
It is precisely the precarious status of this generational order that is the
source of the deep distress and anguish that fuels Antigone's determined
course and the dramatic line of the play.
Given the uniqueness of her family genealogy, then, Antigone
cannot be said to be fighting for parental, paternal or maternal filation
or rightperse. Her action, herviolation of Creon's prohibition on burying
her dead brother, is essentially both a necessary and an impossible
attempt at restoration of her family's skewed genealogy. It is necessary
because she must affirm the priority of the genealogically given, of
those who were made, and made siblings, l!J olhers (than she), in this
case, Polynices. Note that she did perform ''with my hands" burial
rites for her dead brother Eteocles, as well.40 In some translations, it is
also clear that Antigone has already so honored her parents as wen as
Eteocles:'~ three of you have known my hand in death?'4t In addition,
in Oedipus at C%nus, a messenger reports that Ismene and Antigone
prepared their father for burial: they "bathed him in holywater, decked
his body out / in shining linen, the custom for the dead."42
So, given Antigone's family heritage, what can she do to try to
restore or create a generational order that is not horrifying? In my
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vie~ she is adamandy affirming-with rites that are supposed to be
for family members, and hence, especially mark them os such---family
relations created not by her but by other family members. She is
desperately trying to ratify these relations-not instituted or created
by her-as, precisely, brYond her creation. This is the tragic paradox of
having to make someone be a brother-and only a brother-through
stressing that a brother is precisely what one ought not, though one
can, make. Notice also thatAntigone stresses thatPolynices is her brother
(rather than her nephew or uncle) precisely by stressing that Oedipus
is their father (rather than their brother). She is trying to disambiguate
the dual status of brother-father in the case of Oedipus and the multiple
status of brother-nephew-uncle in the case of Polynices, and of herself
as sister-daughter relative to Oedipus and sister-niece-aunt relative to
Polynices. She is ttying to insist upon one of these positions-father
for Oedipus and brother for Polynices-in an essentially restorative
effort, that is, an effort to re-establish a family tree with less horlifying
articulations.
The obvious objection to these speculations is that, as Antigone
herself says, her patents are both dead, at this point in the tale. But
perhaps we need to recall that Antigone interprets her suffering and
that of her siblings as stemming from her father's wrongs.43 And from
this recollection, it is plausible thatAntigonewould be extremely vigilant
about her family's criminal status and about her own potential for
offense against the gods of the dead--even well prior to the period
presented in the pla)'. If her father's offense is "gettinganother brother"
in part through his own ageney; then Antigone could understandably
be concerned to efface that offense and to bar its possible recurrence
throughout the course of her life, even prior to her father's death.
Hence, the elevation of the brother as "that which I cannot get for
myselE" Granted, here she implies that the only reason she cannot get
one is because both of her patents are dead. The obvious interpretation
of this is that thrY (that is, both Oedipus and Jocasta) are required to
get her another brother and, being dead, cannot do so. Her insistence
on her parents being the unique source of a brother is obviously
significant in her task to efface the family crime. And it makes sense
that she would be publicly proclaiming her realization of this unique
source, in the form of an action known by the city as a whole, the
burial of Polynices.44 Butwe can also easily imagine a knowing audience
noting, with cruel humor perhaps, that of course, had Antigone's father
ahne been alive, she could have followed in his footsteps and procured
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for herself a brother by her parent.
1magine, then, that the preoccupation with her confounding
kinsbip precedes the burial prohibition, that awareness of her father's
unwitting crime and its issue lays down for her the track of her tragic
options. Imagine that well prior to her brothers' deaths by interkilling,
the shameful ouroboros in the branches of her family tree keeps her
ever vigilant about precisely what acts constitute the family relations in
question in her tale. Then consider her claim in the enigmatic passage
to be: I cannotget myself another brother.45 Yes, the reason she provides
is that her parents are required to give her a brother and they are both
dead. But the "I cannot" would be the constant, self-addressed,
protective mantra whose more insistent sense is: "I must not." And
this expression of "cannot-must not" is exactly what contains the
W1expressed "law" she stresses but seems never to state explicitly. That
law is: getting oneself a brother is the kind of action that one can
perform though one must not, unlike getting oneself a husband or a
child. In fact, children and husbands are constituted as only children
and husbands-within the kinship order Antigone takes to be
normative-in part precisely by constituting brothers as only brothers,
or siblings as only siblings.
Of course, what a brother is, andwhat actions constitute a brother
as only a brother are strictly tied to the particular kinship order or
orders operating in the pla~Nowhere do I mean to imply the existence
or validity of any universal, trans-temporal or trans-cultural system,
rule or order that would govern or express any constant content to the
term "brother." Nor would I wish to attempt any kind of translation
system for kinsbip, which is essentially what the work of Levi-Strauss
and followers has sought. That is, bis approach to the study of kinship
is basically one that seeks to devise a formalism into which any distinct
kinship order could be translated. As is well known by no\\T, the
anthropological equivalent of the linguistic "target language," in such
projects, is some dominant Occidental kinship system or other.
Rendering the terms of a different kinship order intelligible in one's
own terms alone is the solipsisticgoal of such approaches. The Hegelian
reading of Antigone likewise imposes much too readily Hegel's own
assumptions about family relations, gender roles, and customs pertaining
to death upon the playa
My attempt has been to remain as close as possible to the elements
of kinship as they appear in the play, and not to assume an easy
continuity with kinship terms that operate in presently dominant
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Occidental kinship regimes. Of course, trus is hardly completely
achievable since, among other reasons, my use of contemporary English
language terms commits me to certain current senses of these, in any
case. But if the play continues to tantalize or instruct, trus must in part
be due to readers' assuming some commonality of experience or
conditions between ancient Greek family life and subsequent family
life there and elsewhere. My approach does not avoid the risks of that
assumption. On a related note, I do not mean to imply either that any
coherent single perspective on kinship is evidenced in the play, aside
from the fact that no voice in the drama expresses the view that the
family crime in play is not a violation.
''No generation can free the next"46
The subject of the play is the liberation of one generation by
another. But in a family in which the generational order is, from within
the play's own perspective on the matter of kinship, incestuously
compressed, generatively overlapping, or relationally congested, the
problem of one generation's freeing another is a problem latent in the
very facts of human generation itself. That is, when it comes to
Antigone's generation, one that is produced in violation of divine law;
the effects of such generational violation spread through the very
network they create; the poison is delivered throughout the system by
and in the creation of the system. Hence, it has a kind of necessary
means of propagation; the "curse" of the house of Oedipus is not
most importantly the resounding power of a verbal malediction. 1t is
rather the inescapability of existence as a violation, of being as being-
wrong, or being-as-should-not-be.
Is it possible by one's living, in one's life, to re-establish or to
establish anew a limit when one's very life is only as a violation of that
limit? Can Antigone establish a non-incestuous family? Tragically,the
only way she can establish a non-incestuous family is by recognizing
those family members that she did not bring about and, from within
the predominating perspective of the drama, that she ought not bring
about. For the incestuous violation in the play is due precisely to not
recognizing a progenitor as a progenitor (then recognizing too late),
and hence not heeding a law that one ought not do all one can do; in
other words, the limit must be imposed, it will not impose itself: The
laws and gods of the family prescribe a limit, but the limit must be
imposed by human beings, and violation of it in this case actually is the
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children of Oedipus, and their suffering. On thisvi~ violating Creon's
law should appear in itself to be a negligible offense in comparison
with what is at stake in obeying it47 Obeying Creon's laW; for Antigone,
means not recognizing her parents as parents, which is precisely
Oedipus' failure, as weIl as the source of her very being.
So prior to the tragic conflict of two unyielding wills, in the
persons of Antigone and Creon, the deeper tragedy is the ever-ruined,
imperfeet set of options for restoring a less horrifyingly collapsed
lineage. The deeper tragedy; then, is that the only minimal restoration
of a cleansed lineage, for Antigone, would go by way of honoring the
very parents whose parentage is the ghastly violation. In order not to
repeat her parents' offenses, she must affirm them as parents, wbich
status is precisely the origin of their depravity.
Antigone, in a consumingorientation to purificarion or restorarion
of her family's debased state, views all possible actions as confined on
all sides by actions that are awfully possible yet deadly repetitions of
her parents' accursed legacy. Why mus! she recognize and affirm them
as parents, then? With all the weight of what she describes as a life of
almost intolerable pain and sorrow pressingupon her,48 she is propelled
by an overcompensatory vigilance and unconditional drive to fend off
any possible repetition or hint of recurrence of the family's generative
crime.
Perhaps, then, she endures a feared identification with her father.
It is Oedipus' crime, after all, that predominates in the tale as a whole,
obviously, and this crime is essentially that of not recognizing both
mother and father. For not recognizing bis mother, though, he has
created bis children and their suffering. ButJocasta's crime is different;
it is the crime of not recognizing her child, her sone So by symbolically
recognizing Polynices as her brother, as not onlyirreplaceable in general
hut as irreplaceable by her, Antigone can affirm that her parent's
generative power itself is irreplaceable, thus symbolically "avoiding"
Oedipus' crime, since he supplanted bis father in the couple that was
bis parents.49 By "irreplaceable by her," I mean that Polynices as a brother
is not replaceable by her, in contrast to the roles or relations of hushand
or child being replaceable by her own efforts. I might be charged with
equivocating on the term "recognition" in this discussion, using it both
to mean "to pay homage to" and "to identify by recollection." The
double sense is not problematic for this reading, however, since I do
mean to imply that the first sense includes the second one. So, in the
case of Antigone's symbolic "recognition" of her brother as a brother
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ooIy "recognition" includes her re-identification ofhim as the brother
Polynices.
Antigone is particularly disturbed by her own understanding of
her confused genealogy, and especially by her relation with the
hyperrelated Oedipus. It is clear that the entire tragic incestual crime-
that is, that such a thing is incestual and criminal, according to theplay--
depends in fact on the importance of maternal filiation. For if the
blood tie went primarily through the father, (as it clearly is legally
determined to do at the end of Aeschylus' Oresteia), Antigone's and
Oedipus' relations would not be problematically mixed, or would not
be maximally so mixed. If paternal filiation were the rule, here, then
Antigone and Oedipus, having different fathers, would not be both
siblings and in a relation of descent-for they simply would not be
siblings.50 So, the incestuous nature of Oedipus' procreation depends
on the sociallogic inwhich parentage is importandy carried by maternit)T.
In this family, the mother legates criminality with her very issue--or at
least with the children of her second husband.
Endpoints
Plainly, despite some important commonalities, the proposed
understanding of the enigmatic passage and of the play contrasts with
the accounts offered by Lacan and Buder on several points. To return
to my discussion of Lacan's account, now we can see why Antigone
might be so concemed with those who are ''born of the same womb."
On the proposed reading, Antigone's emphasis on those who are ''born
of the same womb" is not simply an emphasis on those who are
irreplaceableperse. Yes, plainly, they are ranked more highly than others,
but not just any or all others. The crucial comparative others at issue
are those others who permissibly may be replaced by her own agen~
The question is: why is Antigone willing to die for this distinetion
between those whom one is permitted to generate and d10se who one
is not permitted to generate?The answer is thatviolating that distinetion
was precisely the substance of the family crime. Antigone is willing to
die to defend and consecrate the distinetion between those who must
be other-generated and those who can be self-generated. One tragic
outcome of the play is that in her own case she must sacrifice the latter
for the former.
It is for these reasons that brother must be ranked over husband
and child in the case of this fami!J. And it is a weakness of Lacan's
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explanation that it eannot aeeount for the apparent neeessity of this
differenee in treatment. It eannot do so beeause it does not eonstrue
Antigone's distinetion properly, as one between the illicitly autogenerated
and the lieitly heterogenerated.
On the reading proposed here, Butler's eharge that Antigone
appeals to a law that is no law at all reeeives no eonfirmation. For the
proposed reading argues that Antigone appeals to a law whose
applieation is not limited to Polyniees alone, and henee it is not
disqualified from being a law by the paltry seope of its relevanee. On
this reading, the law would mean that siblings ought to reeeive special
treatment as those whom one can but ought not create oneself: The
law is: reeognize your parents as they who can generate those who you
ean, though must not, generate. The erueial eausal eorollary is: it is
preeisely by this reeognition that such beings as parents, children, and
siblings are made as sueh in this partieular kinsbip order. The la~ then,
is a form of ineest prohibition, or more precisely the establishment of
what eounts as prohibited relations. Antigone's aehingly retrospeetive
affirmation of this law does not sueeeed in effaeing the genealogieal
violation without eliminating its fruit: herself: The end of the play
implies that she eannot undo that violation without undoing herself.
This is partially beeause of Creon's position on the priority of
state and ruler over philous, kin and household. From the play's start,
Sophoeles presents Creon as the adamant defender of the priority of
state and ruler overphilous, Irin and household. Philous, or friends and
elose relations, depend for their well-being on a stable, well-ordered
state, for Creon; the state makes possible strong and abiding friendsbips
and elose family relations.51 It is only at the dreadful unraveling of bis
own elose family bonds at the play's end that Creon seems to realize
that bis iron governanee has been no proteetion for bis elose relations.
In exelamatory self-deseription, he eries: "Wailing wreek of a man, /
whom to look to? Where to lean for support?"52 That eradling sbip of
state he had earlier invoked is here no solaee, no refuge.
In sum, the proposed view agrees with Buder's performative
eonstrual of the socially eontingent nature of kinship, but takes the
iterative eharaeter oE the kinship norm in this ease to permit not
Antigone's aberrant deformation of kinship but her essentially
reparative effort at re-formation of an unshamed and unashamed family
eonstellation. Note that this restorative effort is not eonsidered by
Antigone to be solely her own mission, at first, either. The fact that
Antigone initially expects her sister Ismene to share her illicit initiative
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shows that on Antigone's view her sister is plaeed just as weIl to wish
to earry out the burial duties as she is. More importantly, it demonstrates
that the play eannot be about the ineestuous desire of the individual
figure Antigone, at least if the thought of Antigone should be eounted
in answering the question of her ultimate motivations. Surely, there is
no reason to think that she was enjoining her sister to risk death for an
ineestuous desire they both shared for their ungrieved brother.
The paper has argued that Antigone's aim is to un-double her
overwritten kin, even those kin who are dead. How ean anyone in her
family free or honor the next--or the previous---generation when its
generations are barely or tenuously individuated? If the reading sketched
here has any plausibility, it indieates that fragile, eonfeeted kin relations
ean be approaehed by indireetion as well as by targeted direetness. If
"doom extends to an the kin" preeisely as the kin, if the helplessness
of human beings in such netted bonds as families joins them by their
choiee and not, then Antigone's eleetion of her brother Polyniees as
the point at whieh to pluek at the generational tangle is likewise the
ehoiee to release an her kin from their family shame.
Butler is more right than her own claims indieate when she holds
thatAntigone "remains somewhat unthinkable."53 For we must suspeet
that kinship itself is what is "unthinkable:' still, after innumerable and
eontinuing performances of the aneient Greek dramas of family
passions. Otherwise how explain the seemingly automatie reversion to
various "forms of idealized kinship"54 that plainly have made the
Oedipal family impervious to clear view; and particularly in the ease of
this enigmatic passage, have obscured the very nature of the horror
that that play presents. Indeed, Bernard Knox's remonstration quoted
above-"for there is no eloser relationship imaginable than thatbetween
the mother and the ehildren of her own body"-should sound like a
joke when pronouneed about the Oedipal family! Right, "no eloser"-
a tittle too close, in this case, no? That any one of us eould read over
the remark in seriousness is a demonstration of the persistent
unthinkability of the everyday tangle of kinship.
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